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The Debt Problem: Evolution and Prospects
Recent initiatives by Latin American borrowers
have renewed concern about the prospects for
alleviating theinternational debt problem. For
example, at the end ofJuly 1985, Peru announced
that it would limit debt payments to10 percent of
its export revenue. At about the same time, twenty
Latin American governments meeting in Lima, Peru
called for linking the payments on their debt to the
growth in theirexport earnings.
This Lettersuggests a simple analytical framework
for assessing these developments and the ability of
debtorcountries to control their debt burden in
the short-run. The discussion will focus on bor-
rowers in the western hemisphere (Latin America
and the Caribbean) - the source of much of the
recent concern.
The debt-to-exports ratio
The following analysis uses as a measure of acoun-
try's debt burden its total foreign debt relative to
its current earnings from exports of goods and ser-
vices. Changes in this debt-to-exports ratio indi-
cate whether acountry's debt burden is rising or
falling in relation to its capacity to pay. While often
used as a measure of solvency, the ratio may also
be interpreted as an indicator of changes in acoun-
try's liquidity, Le., its ability tomeet payment
obligations on schedule. The higher the ratio, the
higher are the debt servicing requirements relative
to the potentially available flow of export earnings.
As a result, acountry would have to depend more
on additional external financing to respond to any
temporary shocks to its economy.
Using the debt-to-exports ratio allows one to focus
on three key variables that can indicate whether a
reduction in the debt burden is feasible in the
short-run: the rate of interestthe country pays on
its external debt, the growth in its exports of goods
and services, and the level of its netexports of
goods and services (here defined as exports of
goods and services less imports and service pay-
ments, excluding interest payments). Otherthings
being equal, the rate of interest will increase the
debt outstanding and raise the ratio. By the same
token, the growth of exports increases the level of
exports - lowering the ratio. In addition, net
exports provide a (potential) means of retiring debt
or servicing interest payments, which also tends to
lowerthe ratio.
This framework is the basis for the well-known rule
that the debt burdenrises if the interest rate on the
debt exceeds the rate of growth of exports.
However, the rule is only strictly true if netexports
are zero (i.e., the value ofexports equals the vallie
of imports). Positive netexports allow the
possibility of adeclining debt burden, even if
export growth does not match the interest cost of
the debt. This has been an important element in
the external debt management of several major
Latin American borrowing countries.
The relationship between the debt-to-expotts ratio
and its determinants can be expressed
algebraically, buta simple numerical example will
illustrate how it is determined. In 1984, the total
debt of the western hemisphere was $351 billion,
while total exports of goods and services
amounted to $126 billion. This yields adebt-to-
exports ratio of 2.8. If interest rates averaged 10
percent in 1985, and interest payments were met
through international borrowing, the debt out-
standing would rise to $386 billion (1.1 times $351
billion). If at the same time exports grew 4 percent
to $130 billion, the debt-to-exports ratio would
rise to 2.96 ($386 billion/$130 billion) in 1985. If
net exports are positive, however, the surplus can
be used to offset this increase. This simplified
analysis abstracts from other factors that may influ-
ence the debt picture, such as private investment
flows.
Experience in the western hemisphere
The charts illustrate the western hemisphere's
experience within this analytical framework. While
interest rates (represented by the benchmark
interest rate in international loans - the three-
month London Interbank Offer Rate, L1BOR) climbed
from 8.7 percent to14percent between 1978
and 1980, exports grew at an extraordinary rate
exceeding 30 p.ercent annually in both 1979 and
1980 (Chart 2). The debt-to-exports ratio thus de-FRBSF
c1ined (Chart 1) even though there were large
negative net exports in that period (Chart 3).
In 1981, the export growth rate fell below the
interest rate, while netexports remained in deficit.
As a result, the debt-to-exports ratio began to
climb. The situation deteriorated dramatically in
1982. While the interest rate remained ata high
level, thesevere world recession caused an11 per-
cent drop in exports ofgoods and services for the
year and a sharp rise in the debt-to-exports ratio.
This lowered the capacity of borrowers to meet
cash flow requirements and precipitated the debt
crisis. Efforts to curtail imports severely brought the
net export deficit close to zero, but could not pre-
vent the sudden jump in the debt burden and the
concommitant liquidity squeeze.
The debt-to-exports ratio continued torise in
1983, notwithstanding intensified efforts to reduce
imports and the resulting dramatic improvement in
net exports to significant positive levels, because
export growth was near zero while interest rates
remained high. Further improvements in net
exports, made possible by a sharp increase in
export growth and continued curtailment of
imports, finally brought abouta decline in the
debt-to-exports ratio in 1984, although the ratio
remained above its level in 1982.
Aside from illustrating how an export shock
(caused by the world recession) precipitated the
1982 debt crisis, the charts show that borrowers in
the western hemisphere have had tomake adjust-
ments in their economic policies to generate
enough positive net exports to stabilize their debt
burden. Because export growth remained below
the interest rate, the adjustments involved curtail-
ing imports and service payments (excluding
interest). The latterfell by16 percent in 1982, 26
percent in 1983, and increased only marginally in
1984. This degree of import reduction was
unknown in the western hemisphere in the 1970s,
and probably accounts for much of the region's
recent impatience with the adjustment process.
Short-term prospects
Both the Peruvian and Latin American proposals
cited earlier may be interpreted as attempts to
ease import reductions by linkingnet exports
(which include debtservice payments) to the per-
formance of expprts. Peru's position is that its
payment-to-exports ratio should not exceed a cer-
tain percentage. The declaration of the Latin Amer-
ican countries in effect means there should be no
attempt to run a net exports surplus if export
growth falls below acertain threshold, and that the
netexports should grow in proportion to exports
once the threshold is exceeded.
In either case, borrowers in the western
hemisphere would like an arrangement to allow
import growth, but they also have an interest in
controlling their debt burden to restore their
creditworthiness and to maintain the stability of
the financial system that supports their interna-
tional transactions. A look at the likely behavior of
the three determinants of the debt-to-exports ratio
in 1985 will allow us to assess whether it is possible
to accomplish both.
First, the interest costs for borrowers in the western
hemisphere have fallen significantly due to
declines in interest rates, lower spreads, and
waived commission fees on renegotiated debt to
selected borrowers. L1BOR averaged 8.8 percent
from January to May 1985; byjuly it had dropped
below 8 percent. This compares with an average of
13.1 percent in 1982, 9.6 percent in 1983, and 10.7
percent in 1984.
Second, export growth among borrowers in the
western hemisphere depends significantly on out-
put growth in industrial countries. Assuming
moderate u.s. economic growth, a recent estimate
indicates that the growth of major industrialcoun-
tries will average 2.5 percent this year. Empirical
work by William Cline and others suggests that this
may correspond to a rise in the exports of debtor
countries in excess of 4 percent. Under these con-
ditions, export growth in 1985 will fall below the
8.8 percent achieved in 1984, but theregion will
not experience the sudden export drop itdid in
1982.
The figures thus suggest that export growth (about
4 percent) will remain below the rate of interest
(about 10percent, including the spread over
L1BOR) and create a tendency for the debt-to-
exports ratio to rise (from 2.8 to 2.96, as shown
earlier).
Topreventan increase in their relative debt
burden, borrowers in the western hemisphere will
again have to generate positive net exports and
control import growth accordingly. However, theChart 1
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degree of import compression can be relaxed sig-
nificantly. Given theanticipated export growth and
L1BOR, imports and service payments (excluding
interest), couldgrowbyasmuchas 20 percent
without increasing the debt-to-exports ratio. Since
imports were lower than exports in 1984, net
exports can remain positive, and the debHo-
exports ratio may still fall even if import growth far
exceeds export growth in 1985. This assumes that
lenders and borrowers will focus onreducing the
debt-to-exports ratio, ratherthan the volume of
outstanding debt.
While the data illustrate the apparent feasibility of
controlling the relative debt burden in 1985 a mim-
ber of qualifications are in order. Borrowers in the
western hemisphere whose debt-to-exports ratio
considerably exceeds the average may find it more
difficult to stabilize their debt burden. Moreover,
improvements in the world economy have not
uniformly benefitted countries. For example, while
the drop in oil prices facilitates import reduction
and adjustment among many borrowers, it has
reduced the export revenueof oil producers. An
analysis of the aggregate hides important variations
among individual countries.
The apparent impatience of certain borrowers in
the western hemisphere with the adjustment pro-
cess may also complicate its continuation. Sluggish
u.s. economic growth in the first half of1985,
which could have furthered declines in the export
revenue of a: number of borrowers, may have con-
tributed to this impatience. An export decline
would require further import contraction to stabil-
ize the debt-to-exports ratio, making adjustment
more difficult. If u.s. economic growth accelerates
in the second half of1985 as expected, the export
performance of borrowing countries should
improve significantly and thereby ease the pres.-
sures on the adjustment process.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding significant improvements since
1982, a sustained curtailment of imports has made
borrowers impatient with the adjustment process.
In the short-run, itappears possible for borrowers
in the western hemisphere to reduce their relative
debt burdens while allowing some import growth.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 194,986 1,994 12,273 6.7
Loans and Leases1 6 175,778 1,196 11,872 7.2
Commercial and Industrial 51,472 593 2,005 4.0
Real estate 64,243 48 3,306 5.4
Loans to Individuals 35,648 89 6,030 20.3
Leases 5,441 7 406 8.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,126 802 325 2.7
Other Securities2 7,082 - 4 77 .1.0
Total Deposits 203,502 6,830 10,092 5.2
Demand Deposits 51,528 5,775 4,188 8.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,220 969 3,465 12.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,479 904 1,585 12.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,495 151 4,318 3.2
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 45,456 352 7,458 19.6
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 37,935 - 217 - 3,239 - 7.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,483 - 129 2,268 11.2
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+}/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change